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For individual countries, variable trade barriers can be 
used to reduce the volatility of domestic relative to world 
prices. If this is done by countries accounting for a large 
share of the market, its effect is offset by increases in 
world price volatility. This study shows the nature of the 
resulting collective action problem, with the policy being 
ineffective on average in stabilizing domestic prices while 
increasing the volatility of the income transfers from 
terms-of-trade changes. A simple approach to assessing 
the contribution of insulation to the price increases is 
developed and used with new estimates of agricultural 
distortions to assess its contribution to the price spikes in 
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1972–74 and 2006–08 for rice and wheat. The analysis 
suggests that 45 percent of the increase in rice prices in 
2006-08, and 30 percent of the increase in wheat prices, 
was due to insulating behavior. One sign of progress 
since 1972–74 was a substantial reduction in the extent 
of price-insulating behavior by the industrial countries. 
This provides little stabilizing benefit in the rice market 
because countries not classifying themselves at the World 
Trade Organization as developing account for only 3 
percent of world rice consumption. But it does offer 
some benefit for the wheat market where non-developing 
countries account for 27 percent of consumption.  
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Export Restrictions and Price Insulation during Commodity Price Booms 
Will Martin and Kym Anderson 
Prices of grains and other storable commodities are characterized by long periods in 
the doldrums, punctuated by short but intense price spikes (Deaton and Laroque 
1992). Those spikes are of concern not least because they can have large impacts on 
poverty in developing countries (Ivanic and Martin 2008). Accounts of the food price 
spikes of 1973-74, 2006-8 and 2010-11 include discussion of a wide range of 
contributing factors such as exogenous shocks to supply or demand, below-trend 
stock levels, speculative behavior, and trade policy responses to the shock. Johnson 
(1975) emphasizes policy responses in his analysis of the 1973-74 price spike, as have 
most of the available assessments of the 2006-08 shock (Baffes and Haniotis 2010; 
Bouët and Laborde 2010; Hochman et al. 2010; Timmer 2010; Robles, Torero and 
von Braun 2008). Several suggest that export restrictions (and maybe also import 
subsidies) played an important role, just as intensified export subsidies and triggered 
import restrictions played a significant role in 1986-8 when international food prices 
slumped. However, we are unaware of any attempts to quantify the aggregate 
contribution across countries of trade policy responses to international price surges.  
In this paper, we address this issue directly. Following Freund and Özden 
(2008), we assume national trade policy responds to the risk of losses for significant 
groups by insulating the domestic market to some extent from international price 
fluctuations for staple foods. This is consistent with the behavior of many 
governments, and it provides an economic rationale for the econometric estimation of 
price transmission elasticities. We use a standard conceptual framework to derive a 
simple equation that provides at least a rough way to estimate the contribution of 
market-insulating policy behavior to international price spikes for homogenous farm 
products. We then examine evidence from two major upward price spikes (1973-4 
and 2006-8) for the key commodities of wheat and rice. Policy implications are drawn 
out in the final section of the paper.  
 




International Price Volatility and National Policy Responses 
Consider a weather- (or financial market-) induced exogenous shock to the global 
market for a food staple that causes a surge in its international price. Suppose that, in 
response, exporting countries impose or raise an export tax or tighten export 
restrictions (or lower any export subsidy), and importing countries reduce their tariff 
or other import restrictions (or introduce or raise an import subsidy) to reduce the rise 
in their domestic price. If both sets of countries try to reduce the impact of the shock 
on domestic prices to the same extent, their attempts will be collectively futile. This is 
very easy to show graphically in the case where first the exporters and then the 
importers seek to completely block the effect of an increase in the price of food 
resulting from an initial shock.  
For an individual small exporting country, the effect of the increase in its 
(explicit or implicit) export tax it is to reduce the domestic price relative to the newly-
raised world price. The same effect occurs in a small importing country that reduces 
its (explicit or implicit) import tariff. If a sufficient number of exporting countries 
intervene in this way, their export restrictions cause the world price of the good to rise 
further, thereby reducing the impact of each country’s initial action on its domestic 
price. This situation is depicted in Figure 1, where the excess supply curve of the 
exporting country group is ES and the excess demand curve of the importing country 
group is ED following the exogenous shock but prior to any changes to trade 
restrictions. If an export tax is then applied, the world price needed to obtain any 
given level of exports is higher, since part of the export price is paid to the exporting 
government. This is reflected in the ES curve moving up to ES,
1 the effects of which 
are to raise the world price from Pw to Pw and lower the domestic price from Pw to Pd. 
   
                                                 
1 If quantitative export restrictions were imposed instead, the rights to export become valuable, with the 
holders of the export rights receiving the benefits that would accrue to the government if an export tax 




Figure 1. Key impacts of an export restriction 
 
In the situation depicted in Figure 1, the exporting country group gains from 
the improvement in their export price. However, production incentives are reduced 
and consumers have an incentive to increase their demand, even though export prices 
are higher,. The global social cost associated with these incentives is given by the 
triangle abc. That can be subdivided into a loss to private agents in the importing 
group of area bcPw’Pw, a loss to private agents in the exporting group of area baPdPw, 
and a gain to the government or export quota holders in the exporting country group 
of area acPw’Pw. Whether the exporting countries as a group enjoy a net gain from 
restricting exports depends on whether the upper rectangle (the terms of trade gain) is 
larger than the lower triangle (the social cost). Since the social costs rise with the 
square of the export tax equivalent (P
'
w – Pd), while the terms of trade gain is likely to 
rise roughly linearly with the rate, the benefits to the exporter group will become 














countries unambiguously lose from the export restrictions as they transfer income to 
the exporter and reduce net consumption.
2  
If policy makers in importing countries were concerned primarily about the 
impact on their terms of trade of the imposition of export restrictions, they might 
respond by raising tariffs on their imports. However, during episodes of international 
food price spikes, the response has typically been the opposite: tariffs on food imports 
are reduced in an attempt to avoid adverse impacts on domestic consumers. This 
response reduces the cost imposed on the importing country group by its own 
protectionist barriers. However, it will compound the increase in world prices 
resulting from the initial price shock and the policy response by exporters. It will also 
add to the exporter group’s terms-of-trade benefits resulting from the initial upward 
price shock and from its own imposition of export restrictions.   
In Figure 2, exporters attempt to completely offset the impact of the initial 
increase in the price of the good by shifting the ES curve to ES'. Importers seek to 
achieve the same insulation by reducing tariffs (or paying import subsidies) so as to 
shift the ED curve to ED'. As is evident in Figure 2, the combined effect of these 
policy changes is to leave domestic prices in both importers and exporters at the post-
shock level Pw and to raise the international price from Pw' to Pw''. Despite the 
attempts of both the importer and exporter country groups to fully offset the original 
increase in price to Pw, domestic prices and quantities unchanged at their post-shock 
level (P0 in the Figure). The only effect of these policies is to compound the terms-of-
trade shift against the importing country group and in favor of the exporting group, 
generating a transfer from the former to the latter of (Pw''-P0).Q in Figure 2 (in 
addition to that caused by the initial exogenous shock). This is in sharp contrast with a 
move from autarchy towards free trade, which is able to reduce price risk through 
diversification of market outlets very substantially since the correlations between 
commodity output shocks across countries are very limited (Johnson 1975).  
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Figure 2. Impacts of equal export barrier increases and import barrier 
reductions 
 
Insulation generates a classic collective-action problem akin to when a crowd stands 
up in a stadium to get a better view: no one gets a better view by standing, but any 
that remain seated get a worse view. This collective action is, unfortunately, not just 
completely ineffective—it generates an international public ‘bad’ by amplifying the 
volatility in the world price of the product, and hence the volatility of the income 
transfers associated with terms-of-trade changes. 
  To assess the implications of price insulation on a homogenous product’s 
international price, p
*,
 we begin with the global market equilibrium condition:  
(1)  Σi (Si(pi)+vi)  -  ΣiDi(Pi) = 0 
where Si is the supply in region i; pi is the region’s producer price; vi is a random 
production shift variable for that region; Di is demand in region i (assumed to be not 
subject to shocks from year to year); and Pi is the consumer price in region i. We 
assume that pi = (1+tp).p
* where tp is the distortion rate between the producer price and 
international price, and that Pi = (1+tc).p
* where tc is the distortion rate between the 
consumer price and international price. With a focus on border measures, we can use 
a single variable for the power of the trade tax equivalent, T = (1+t) where t = tp














Totally differentiating equation (1), rearranging it, and expressing the results 
in percentage change form, yields the following expression for the impact of a set of 
changes in trade distortions on the international price: 
(2)         
                      -                
       -                      
where       is the proportional change in the international price;      is an exogenous 
stochastic shock to output such as might result from better or worse weather than 
average; ηi is the elasticity of demand; γi is the elasticity of supply; Gi is the share at 
international prices of country i in global demand; and Hi is the share of country i in 
global production. That is, the impact on the international price of a change in trade 
distortions in country i depends on the importance of that country in global supply and 
demand, as well as the responsiveness of its production and consumption to price 
changes in the country, as represented by γi and ηi. With large proportional changes in 
trade policies and other shocks, the effects are no longer purely additive as in equation 
(2) and we need to take into account the interaction between these two proportional 
changes. 
A notable implication of equation (2) is that a uniform policy response by all 
countries (    is the same for all i) will make the elasticities of supply and demand 
irrelevant to the impact on international prices: if all countries alter their distortions 
by a uniform amount, the international price will change by an exactly-offsetting 
amount, leaving domestic prices unchanged.  
If we assume that output cannot respond in the short run and that inventory 
levels are low enough that stock adjustments have limited effect, then γi=0. If we 
further assume that the national elasticities of final demand for the product (ηi) are the 
same across countries, then equation (2) suggests we can estimate the contribution to 
international price changes resulting from changes in national trade policies as simply 
the negative of the consumption-weighted global average of the  s Ti' ˆ . 
Incidentally, if we consider the case where protection varies endogenously in 
response to changes in the international price, trade distortions are no longer an 
exogenous source of shocks, and international prices will change only in response to 
exogenous shocks such as weather-induced shocks to output. In this case, the 




(3)                  
  Hivi    i  
  (Giη
i  - Hiγi     i            
where θi is the elasticity of transmission from the international price to the consumer 
price in country i; and ϕi is the elasticity of transmission from the international price 
to the domestic producer price. Where we focus only on trade measures, such that 
these elasticities of price transmission are the same, it follows that the impact of price 
insulation on the international price is larger the smaller are those price transmission 
elasticities. If the short-run elasticity of price transmission is, for instance, 0.5 in all 
countries (a finding in line with that of Anderson et al. (2010) for key commodities 
such as rice and wheat since 1985, and consistent with the results in Tyers and 
Anderson (1992) for earlier periods), the impact of any exogenous shock on the 
international price will be twice as large as it would be with full price transmission. In 
this situation, the variance of the international price will be four times as large as it 
would be in the absence of price insulation. If all countries used the price transmission 
elasticity of 0.15 implied by the 85 percent compensating duty under the proposed 
Special Safeguard Mechanism (Hertel, Martin and Leister 2010), then the impact of 
any shock on the international price would be magnified by a factor of 6.7, and the 
variance by a factor of 44. 
The Uruguay Round agreement of the WTO attempted to address this problem 
by banning variable import levies and other directly insulating policies, and by 
counting protection provided by measures involving administered prices under both 
the market access and domestic support measures. However, the Uruguay Round 
bindings on import tariffs and subsidies are at levels well above historically applied 
rates in most cases, providing room for countries to raise applied rates without 
infringing their WTO commitments. Furthermore, no effective disciplines yet apply in 
the WTO to variations in export restrictions. With that in mind, we turn now to seeing 
how much of a contribution insulating behavior of national governments had on 
international prices of rice and wheat in price spike periods before and after the 





The Cases of Rice and Wheat 
The two food commodities that have received the most attention because of price 
surges are the key staples of wheat and rice. The length of their international price 
spikes around 1974 were broadly similar to those around 2008, but the height of the 
spike – particularly for rice – was greater in 1974. The recent price rises were more 
gradual except in the final months, so we consider an extra year in the lead-up to the 
2008 spike.  
Estimates of the Ti’s are available for all key rice and wheat countries, in the 
form of nominal assistance coefficients (NACs), from three sources. Anderson and 
Valenzuela (2008) provide them to 2004 for developing countries and to 2007 for 
high-income countries (summarized in Anderson 2009). They are similarly available 
for high-income countries for 2008 in OECD (2010). For developing countries, 
Anderson and Nelgen (2010b) provide estimates based on FAO and World Bank data 
on producer and border prices, respectively, for 2005 to 2008. The most-recent 
developing country estimates are less reliable than the NAC estimates in Anderson 
and Valenzuela (2008), for several reasons. One is that the coverage is not as 
extensive, because domestic prices are not available for some countries. Another is 
that the FAO’s producer prices and World Bank international prices are not always as 
reliable as previously-used domestic and border prices from national statistical 
agencies. The FAO producer prices in US current dollars (FAO 2010) were converted 
into an index set at 100 for 2004, and the 2004 US dollar prices in Anderson and 
Valenzuela (2008) updated using the changes in these indexes through 2008. 
Likewise, the Thailand 5 percent broken rice and Canadian wheat prices from the 
World Bank were converted  to indexes set at 100 for 2004, and the 2004 border 
prices in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) updated using changes in those indexes 
through 2008. 
These NAC estimates are reported in Table 1 for the two upward price spike 
periods. For each of the regions shown, as well as for the world as a whole, the 
patterns are strikingly similar: falls in the NAC as the international price rose. The 




country groups, however. As shown in Figure 3, the proportional change was very 
similar for high-income and developing countries in the 1970s spike, albeit only half 
as large for wheat as for rice. In the more recent spike, the proportional change for 
high-income countries was somewhat smaller in the case of rice and very much 
smaller in the case of wheat than for developing countries.  
Assuming that output was able to respond only to a limited degree in the first 
half of each spike, and that the national elasticities of demand (including stock 
demand) are similar across countries for each product, we set the γi’s to zero and use 
equation (2) to estimate the contribution to international price changes of price-
insulating behavior resulting from national price-insulating policy behavior is the 
(negative of the) consumption-weighted global average change in the national Ti’s. 
For rice the cumulative decline shown in the world row of Table 1 was 46 percent 
between 2005 and 2008, which is in the same order of magnitude as the decline 
between 1972 and 1974 of 58 percent. For wheat, the globally-weighted T ˆ  was -28 
percent over the 2005-08 period, compared with -30 percent in 1972-74.  
According to World Bank price data, the world price of rice increased by 127 
percent between 2005 and 2008, and the price of wheat increased by 114 percent. By 
taking the interactions between the proportional changes in trade policy and other 
factors into account, we can estimate the magnitude of the non-trade shocks. 
Comparing these with the estimated trade shocks suggest that in 2005-08 more than 
45 percent of the explained change in the international price of rice is due to the 
changes in border restrictions that countries used in an attempt to insulate themselves 
from the initial increases in price. For wheat, the corresponding estimate was 29 
percent. In 2008 alone, the change in protection on rice explains almost half of the 90 
percent increase in rice prices observed for that year. 
One important and encouraging difference between the 2008 price surge and 
the earlier one around 1974 is an apparent sharp reduction in the extent of price 
insulation in high-income countries. For rice, their NAC declined 45 percent between 
1973 and 1974, while it fell only 8 percent between 2007 and 2008. In the case of 
wheat, the comparable numbers were 28 percent and 12 percent. While desirable, the 
reduction in insulating behavior by these countries has a very limited beneficial 




developing countries in agriculture account for only 3 percent of world rice 
consumption. For wheat, where these countries account for 27 percent of world 
consumption, the benefit is likely somewhat greater. However, it is clear from these 
trade shares that the key trade policy influence on the stability of world markets is 
what happens in developing countries.  
Within the group of developing countries, there are also very substantial 
differences in the extent of price insulation. As shown in Figure 4, it appears that 
domestic price rises for wheat in the 2006-8 period were restrained much more in 
Asia than in other world regions. This suggests that—in contrast with the case 
considered in Figures 1 and 2—price insulating policies may not have been 
completely ineffective in stabilizing prices in all regions. Rather, their effect may 
have been to reduce the volatility of domestic prices in some regions, while increasing 
this volatility in others.  
Are rice and wheat representative of other farm products in terms of insulating 
behavior by governments? There is no global database for all farm products for the 
most recent spike period, but there is for the upward spike of 1974-6 and the slump of 
1984-8. Anderson and Nelgen (2010a) decompose the nominal rate of assistance 
(NRA) estimates, for the overall agricultural sector of all 75 countries in the Anderson 
and Valenzuela (2008) database, into the various border and domestic measures for 
developing and high-income countries. The annual estimates summarized for the 
upward spike period of 1972-76, and the downward spike period of 1984-8, are 
reported in Table 2.  
In both of these periods, export restrictions were the dominant instrument for 
developing countries; they became more and then less important in the upward spike 
period of 1972-76, and conversely in the downward spike period of 1984-88. In high-
income countries there were virtually no taxes or other restrictions on exports, but 
export subsidies followed the same path as import tariffs over those spike periods: U-
shaped during the upward spike, inverted U-shaped in the downward spike. Together 
these estimates suggest the experiences with rice and wheat were not inconsistent with 
the pattern for farm products in general, especially when bearing in mind that the 




to remain close to zero and hence dampen year-to-year fluctuations in the aggregate 
estimates.  
 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Trade policy changes—and particularly export restrictions—are frequently discussed 
as contributing factors to food price surges. This paper examines the role of trade 
barriers in contributing to surges. It first highlights the collective action problem 
associated with the use of these measures as stabilization policies, noting that the use 
of these measures by all countries would be ineffective in stabilizing domestic prices, 
while magnifying international price instability associated with exogenous shocks to 
food markets. We develop a simple approach to assessing the contribution of price 
insulating trade policy actions on international price changes for individual 
agricultural commodities, and use this approach to estimate the extent to which 
changes in trade policy measures have contributed to price surges for the key staple 
foods of rice and wheat.  
Our analysis shows that changes in trade policies contributed very 
substantially to the increases in world prices of these staple crops in both the 1973-4 
and 2006-8 price surges. In the 2006-8 surge, insulating policies affecting the market 
for rice explain 45 percent of the increase in the international rice price, while almost 
30 percent of the observed change in the international price of wheat during 2006-08 
can be explained by the changes in border protection rates.  
The evidence in Figure 3 suggests that at least high-income countries altered 
their NACs less in the most recent price spike period than in the two previous ones. 
That is not inconsistent with the fact that the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture, which came into force with the creations of the WTO in 1995, involved 
commitments to bind tariffs and subsidies. Nor is the finding that developing 
countries are still very active users of variable border measures and especially export 
restrictions, given (a) that developing country bindings are well above applied rates 
and (b) that the WTO has no effective restrictions on agricultural export measures. 




needed before it would be possible to say how much of these changes can be 
attributed to the presence or absence of WTO disciplines.  
Since bindings on import tariffs and subsidies even for many high-income 
countries were made at levels well above historically applied rates, plenty of ‘wiggle 
room’ for countries to raise applied rates without infringing their commitments to 
other WTO members remains. Furthermore, with no effective disciplines yet applying 
to export restrictions, the WTO membership is yet to address the other half of this 
beggar-thy-neighbor problem. And if a Special Safeguard Mechanism were to be 
introduced as part of a Doha Development Agenda agreement, the problem would be 
become even worse (Hertel, Martin and Leister 2010). An obvious solution is to seek 
a collective agreement to limit the extent of price-insulating policy use. Perhaps the 
most-recent experience with price spikes in 2006-8, and again in 2010-11, will make 
WTO members more willing to address this issue. 
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Figure 3: Percentage changes in Ti’s for rice and wheat,
a high-income and 






Source: Anderson and Nelgen (2010b). 































Figure 4: Indexes of real international and producer prices of rice and wheat, 





Source: FAOSTAT producer prices (www.fao.org) and international reference prices 
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Table 1: Weighted Average Ti’s for Rice and Wheat,
a 1972-76, and 2005-08 
Rice  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  2005  2006  2007  2008 
World  1.30  0.93  0.54  0.90  0.98  1.33  1.24  1.15  0.72 
High-income countries  3.06  2.29  1.26  1.71  2.35  3.35  2.66  2.28  2.10 
Developing countries  1.03  0.73  0.45  0.82  0.87  1.25  1.19  1.10  0.66 
   ASIA   1.03  0.71  0.42  0.82  0.86  1.24  1.17  1.08  0.66 
   Africa  0.97  0.60  0.38  0.66  0.86  0.99  1.09  1.29  0.70 
   LAC  1.00  1.08  0.89  0.90  0.98  1.51  1.46  1.39  0.86 
Wheat  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  2005  2006  2007  2008 
World  1.15  0.81  0.81  0.95  0.94  1.19  1.14  1.02  0.86 
High-income countries  1.11  0.83  0.80  0.90  0.92  1.20  1.17  1.04  1.03 
Developing countries  1.22  0.77  0.81  1.02  0.96  1.18  1.13  1.00  0.75 
   ASIA   1.33  0.82  0.88  1.02  0.94  1.21  1.15  1.01  0.70 
   Africa  1.03  0.75  0.63  0.82  0.92  1.15  1.03  0.93  1.08 
   LAC  0.95  0.57  0.67  1.11  1.07  1.02  1.02  0.97  0.84 
 
a Weights are consumption shares for the sample countries. Source: Anderson and Nelgen (2010b). 19 
 
Table 2: Contributions to Total Agricultural NRA
a from Different Policy Instruments, by Region, 1972-76 and 1984-88, % 
(a) Developing countries  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976    1984  1985  1986  1987  1988 
Border measures                       
Import tax equivalent  22  2  2  8  6    7  7  8  9  8 
Export subsidies  4  0  0  1  1    1  1  1  1  1 
Export tax equivalent  -26  -18  -24  -22  -9    -20  -10  -14  -19  -22 
Import subsidy equivalent  -6  -5  -5  -2  -1    -1  -1  -1  -1  -2 
ALL BORDER MEASURES  -22  -21  -28  -16  -4    -14  -3  -6  -11  -15 
TOTAL NRA(incl. domestic measures)  3  -14  -29  -17  -2    -15  -2  -5  -9  -13 
(b) High-income countries  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976    1984  1985  1986  1987  1988 
Border measures                       
Import tax equivalent  25  18  15  21  30    33  34  50  49  42 
Export subsidies  4  2  1  2  2    2  4  7  7  5 
Export tax equivalent  0  -1  0  0  0    0  -1  0  0  0 
Import subsidy equivalent  -1  -3  -3  -1  -1    0  0  0  0  0 
ALL BORDER MEASURES  27  17  13  22  31    35  37  57  56  46 
TOTAL NRA(incl. domestic measures)  29  18  13  24  32    46  52  70  69  59 
 
a All entries have been generated by dividing the producer subsidy equivalent of all (including domestic price, non-product-specific and 
‘decoupled’) measures by the total agricultural sector’s gross production valued at undistorted prices. Source: Anderson and Nelgen (2010b). 